
Change and Continuity in Post-Unification German Foreign Policy

Workshop Seminar with Young Diplomats,
Myanmar Foreign Service, Naypyitaw

Gliederung

1. German Foreign + Security Policy 1949-1989
2. Why should German Foreign Policy change after unification?
3. How to measure change and continuity in Foreign Policy?
4. Germany's Foreign policy role: change and continuity
5. Conclusion



The Economist 8th July 2017

Step 1

German Foreign and Security Policy 1949-1989

Provisions in Basic Law (Constitution) shaping German Foreign and Security Policy after 1949

- 1. Limited Sovereignty/Division:** up to 1990 (former) occupying powers (USA, SU, F/UK) held sovereign rights over Germany proper and Berlin (divided in Western/Eastern Sector).

- 2. Norms binding Foreign + Security policy:** Basic laws obliges Federal Republic to pursue Human Rights, peace, openness towards international law + , European integration and (until 1990) unification of Germany and recovery of full sovereignty.

- 3. Procedural limits of Basic law:** BL foresees division of competences in executive branch and joined powers by executive and legislative branch in foreign affairs (treaty ratification, oversight of armed forces) and strong oversight by Federal Constitutional Court.


Constitutional Norms Shaping German Security Policy (1949)

1. **War and Force are banned as instruments of German Foreign policy:** Germany foregoes establishment of Armed Forces and should join System of Collective Security (**Nomore war! Art. 4 Abs. 3 GG; Art. 9 GG, Art. 26 Basic Law**).
2. **Federal Republic should never again deviate from Community of (Western) Civilized Nations:** G. must uphold human rights, international law and be willing to cede sovereignty to int. organizations (**Never (again) alone! Art. 1, 24, 25 Basic Law**).
3. Originally, the Basic law „had a negative attitude towards German Armed Forces“ (Heydte 1974: 55), so that the BL had to be revised to accomodate rearmament.

Four phases of expanding the aims of the use of force in German Security Policy

Territorial Defense + Unarmed deployments	+ Peace-keeping Operations	+ Peace-making Operations	+ Anti-Terror- Operations	
1955	1989	1994	2001	2015
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Territorial Defense 2. Alliance defense 3. Deployment of military advisors 4. Disaster relief 5. Logistical support of UN-Peacekeeping Operations 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Humanitarian Missions 2. Robust Peacekeeping 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Peacemaking Operations 2. Lead nation role 3. Crisis evacuation 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Humanitarian Interventions 2. Anti-Terror-Operations 	


Domestic contestations over expansion of executive competences in German Security Policy 1949-1990



Step 2


Why should German Foreign Policy Change
after unification?

When a country's power capacities grow, it will act more autonomously (Realism).



- Through unification, Germany's population grew by 18 Mio. citizens (total of 82 Mio).
- Through unification, Germany's GDP grew by 8%.
- In the course of German unification, the 2+4 treaty foresaw the withdrawal of 338,000 soldiers (in 24 divisions) and 4,200 tanks, 8,200 armored vehicles, 3,600 artillery pieces, 106,000 other motor vehicles, 690 aircraft, 680 helicopters, and 180 rocket systems + 208,000 relatives.
- Prediction: Germany should act more unilaterally, use grown military power and try to dominate int. Org. where it is strongest member state.

When the composition of a country's society changes, its foreign policies will represent the new mixture of societal interests (Liberalism).



- Through unification, industries of low productivity joined a very competitive economy, leaving many people jobless, calling for social protection by government (Left party prospered).
- Former GDR business has strong ties to Eastern European countries, opening new business opportunities + challenges
- Former GDR citizens held much more sceptical views towards major western int. Institutions, such as NATO and EU, resulting in weaker societal support respectively.

Shared experiences and world views shape foreign policies, resulting in successful policies being continued while disasters cause foreignpolicy learning (Constructivism).



- West Germany reintegrated into the community of civilized states after accepting responsibility for Nazi-Germany war crimes and developing a preference for Diplomacy and trade.
- Reinforcing the positive effects of a „Civilian Power“ role, unification resulted in much continuity and some foreign policy changes.
- Changing external expectations and domestic learning processes in the 1990s, have resulted in a more robust security policy (use of force) and willingness to take on international leadership roles.

Step 3

How to measure change and continuity in
foreign policy?

Charles Hermann 1990: Changing Course. When Governments redirect foreign policy

Type of Change	Instruments	Strategies	Goals/Outlook
Adjustment change	++ incremental		
Program change	++	++	
Goal change	++	++	+
International orientation change	++	++	++

Charles Hermann 1990: Changing Course. When Governments redirect foreign policy


Type of Change	Instruments	Strategies	Goals/Outlook
Adjustment change	Increase/ decrease in foreign aid		
Program change	Increase in use of force	Unilateral use of force	
Goal change	Increase in sanctions	Multilateral sanctions	Human rights compliance
International orientation change	++	++	<i>Change from status quo to revisionist power</i>

Step 4

Germany's Foreign policy role:
change and continuity

International Leadership: Role definition and characteristics


- International leadership may be defined as a social role which is composed of internal and external (ego-alter) expectations directed towards taking up a set of functional role elements by one or several leaders to achieve a commonly held group goal.



Cf. Harnisch 2014

Typology of international leadership roles

Composition of leadership / Scope of followership	Uni-Bilateral	Collective
Coalition		
Inclusive		



Cf. Harnisch 2014

External Expectations II: Mr Radek Sikorski, Foreign Minister of Poland, Berlin, 28 November 2011

- Sixth, that because of your size and your history you have a special responsibility to preserve peace and democracy on the continent. Jurgen Habermas has wisely said that "If the European project fails, then there is the question of how long it will take to reach the status quo again. Remember the German Revolution of 1848: When it failed, it took us 100 years to regain the same level of democracy as before."
- What, as Poland's foreign minister, do I regard as the biggest threat to the security and prosperity of Poland today, on 28th November 2011? It's not terrorism, it's not the Taliban, and it's certainly not German tanks. It's not even Russian missiles which President Medvedev has just threatened to deploy on the EU's border. The biggest threat to the security and prosperity of Poland would be the collapse of the Euro zone.
- **And I demand of Germany that, for your own sake and for ours, you help it survive and prosper. You know full well that nobody else can do it. I will probably be first Polish foreign minister in history to say so, but here it is: *I fear German power less than I am beginning to fear German inactivity.***
- **You have become Europe's indispensable nation. You may not fail to lead. Not dominate, but to lead in reform.**

Quelle: https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/event_downloads/radoslaw_sikorski_poland_and_the_future_of_the_eu_0.pdf

**West-Orientation
(positive Other: Model)**

Significant Others
West European states

Significant Others
USA/Allies

Significant Others
East European states

**Globalization
(pos.+ neg. Others:
Self assertion)**

United Nations

Generalized
Other

Current
Self

Actor




Structure

Historical
Self

**Economic miracle Germany
(positive self-image: model)**

**Increasingly positive self-
identification over time**

**NS-Germany
(neg. self: Perpetrator)**



Eurocrisis: Changing dynamics of German leadership

- Phase 1: FRG prefers bilateral aid for Greece with IMF support.
- Phase 2: FRG initiates EFSF/ESM with France; Reform of SGP; rejection of €-Bonds.
- Phase 3: FRG accepts ECB as lender of last resort, balancing the Eurogroups austerity policy.

Composition of leadership/Scope of followership	of	Singular	Collective
Coalition			Phase 2 (intergouvernemental-exclusive)
Inclusive		Phase 1 (national-inclusive)	Phase 3 (intergouvernemental-supranational inclusive)

Cf. Harnisch 2014

Crisis in Ukraine: Leadership dynamics and German Foreign Policy

- Phase 1: FRG calls for EU restraint during Maidan-Protests.
- Phase 2: FRG brokers German-France-Polish-Russian agreement February 21, 2014.
- Phase 3: FRG uses Geneva and Normandy Groups (excl. POL+EUHR) to negotiate Minsk I+II agreement; Berlin supports Swiss-OSCE-Chairperson initiated Monitoring-Mission.

Economic sanctions:

- FRG calls for sequentialized sanctions against domestic contestation (Industry Association)
- FRG brokers between Southern EU/MS (Sceptics) and Eastern EU-MS (protagonists) of sanctions.
- FRG ties sanctions to Minsk agreement implementation.

Military instruments:

- FRG sees no military crisis solution.
- FRG prefers rotational, non premanent deployment of NATO troops in Poland/Baltic states.
- FRG initiates/supports Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)
- FRG initiates Transatlantic Capability+Enhancement Initiative (TACET)

Vgl. Harnisch 2017

Migration crisis: Leadership dynamics and German Foreign policy

- Phase 1: FRG prefers Firstcountry entry rule of Dublin system (until August 2014).
- Phase 2: Fed. Migration Agency (BAMF) declares end of Dublin implementation for Syrian refugees (4.09.2014): Chancellor Merkel negotiates transfer agreement with Hungary/Austria
- Phase 3: Failure of internal EU-transfer of migrants leads to EU-Turkey refugee agreement (March 2016).

Composition of leadership role/Scope of followership	Singular	Collective
Coalition	Phase 2 (national-exclusive)	Phase 3: intergouv.-exclusive
Inclusive	Phase 1 (national-inclusive)	

Cf. Harnisch 2017

Step 4

Conclusion

Continuity and Change in German Foreign Policy

1. German foreign policy is characterized by continuity in most policy areas after unification, most notably in the further deepening and widening of the European Union and the strengthening of international institutions, such as the WTO, the ICC or the AIIB.
2. Change in most visible in security policy, e.g. the use of force, anti-terror policies after 9/11 and the emerging field of cyber security policy.
3. In the past decade, Germany has taken up several leadership roles, resulting in weak + contested institutionalization (Eurocrisis), no substantial institutionalization (Ukrainian crisis) and strongly contested institutionalization during the migration crisis.
4. German leadership assertion, particularly in migration crisis, has resulted in various unintended consequences, substantially challenging current domestic and EU-Institutions (German party system, coalition dynamics, state elections, Dublin system, Brexit, Eastern European challenge to EU rule of law)

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